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Welfare and the City
The main purpose of this article is to construct a concept of the welfare city that hopefully will facilitate the understanding and theorization 
of contemporary urban development in the Western 
countries. In order to do this, we first explore the con-
cept of welfare. Our major message is that the concept 
is ambivalent, heterogeneous, evaluative and contes-
table. To establish this we rely on welfare economics and 
the debate on the welfare state. We also demonstrate our 
message into the debate on different welfare regimes. 
Focusing on the utilitarian element in welfare, we then 
establish a link between utilitarianism, architecture and 
the modern city. This provides the basis for a concep-
tualization of the welfare city that integrates the 
differences between welfare regimes. Following this, 
we present some major developmental tendencies of 
the welfare regimes as background for a discussion of 
the impact of globalization processes on the welfare 
states and the welfare cities. Here the emphasis is on 
social and spatial polarization and on the fate of social 
citizenship as the solidarity basis for welfare in a globa-
lizing world.
In the late 1960s Manuel Castells initially and impli-
citly presented the idea of a welfare city as “The Urban 
Question” (1977) of the time. We close our article by 
discussing Jacques Donzelot’s recent formulation of a 
new urban question by relating it to the question of a 
new basis of solidarity for urban welfare.
Ambivalent welfare
The meaning of the concept of welfare is imprecise, 
ambivalent and contested. The concept has, one could 
say, a fluid, mobile character. One observer remarks 
that ‘welfare’ mostly refers to “having access to what 
is needed for a good life. But the conceptions of what 
that is, are many” (Andersen 1988: 9). Yet, even this sta-
tement is contestable since welfare may be considered 
as a humiliation. In this view, you are precisely not le-
ading a good life if you are on welfare. One complaint is 
that the welfare society “causes humiliation through 
its own institutions” by creating “dependent people, 
who are willing to sell their birthright of personal auto-
nomy and pride for a bowl of lentils from the public 
kitchen” (Margalit 1996: 224). Further, the scope of 
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the concept seems almost all embracing. Some would 
argue that welfare primarily includes the covering of 
“basic human needs” (Pinch 1997: 5) for food, shelter, 
health care; others would include needs for education, 
culture, work, leisure, solidarity, mobility, recognition, 
democratic participation etc.
Pushpin as good as poetry
One way to establish some order in this heterogeneous 
and ambivalent situation is provided by the discipline 
of welfare economics. Here the concept of welfare 
includes any useful good or service (classical utilitaria-
nism) or anything preferred by individuals (modern 
subjectivism) that it is not freely available. To come 
under the heading of economic welfare, the item in 
question must need the embodiment of labour to be 
useful (classical) or should be available only as a scarce 
good (modern) (Myint 1948, Little 1965). Whether the 
need or preference is basic or superfluous is an irrele-
vant question. In a celebrated formulation the father 
of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham, stated: “if the 
quantity of pleasure is the same, pushpin is as good 
as poetry” (Bentham quoted in Macintyre 1996: 207). 
Welfare economics, however, is not only preoccupied 
by the production and allocation of utilities or preferred 
goods; the main concern is to improve the economic 
welfare of a society of individuals. The main question 
is not the creation of wealth but the distribution of 
wealth among the individuals of a society in such a 
way that the total welfare (utility, pleasure, happiness, 
preferred goods) of the society is optimized. For neo-
classical welfare economics it means the allocation of 
given scarce resources and goods in such a way that no 
one can be better off without someone else becoming 
worse off in terms of preferences (given the income 
distribution) (Little 1965). This so-called Pareto-crite-
rion is a modern equivalent to Jeremy Bentham’s uti-
litarian principle that “the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number” is the welfare criterion for a society 
and in general the measure of “right and wrong” (Sa-
bine 1968: 676). For classical utilitarianism utility was 
a measurable and interpersonal comparable entity 
that could provide the scientific basis for the investi-
gation of welfare and welfare maximization, and thus 
also for a science of ethics. To say that some change of 
circumstances will increase total happiness in a society 
is the same thing as to say that such a change is good 
(Little 1965: 7). The modern subjectivists did not be-
lieve in utility, but rather in ordered preferences. The 
aim, however, was the same: to investigate the extent 
to which economics as a science can evaluate whether 
or not a given state of an economy must be changed in 
order to improve total societal welfare.
This is not the place to enter the technical details 
of welfare economics. Our main point is that if ‘econo-
mics’ turns into ‘welfare economics’ then evaluation or 
appreciation follows. Economics prefixed with ‘welfare’ 
turns into “a sub-discipline that evaluates the activi-
ties of markets, firms, industries, individuals and go-
vernment agencies” in terms of the contribution to so-
cial welfare. In this respect welfare economics reflects 
“a social philosophy in which social institutions and 
cultural conventions have no intrinsic value”. They 
are valuable “only to the extent that they are valuable 
to individual members of society” (Baumol & Wilson 
2001: xv).
What then, has welfare economics had to say about 
such evaluation? Two things should be mentioned 
here. Firstly, that the allocation of goods by the market, 
under idealized competitive conditions, can realize 
the Pareto condition that everyone should be better 
off in terms of happiness or levels of choice (Andersen 
1988: 40). Secondly, that welfare economics cannot 
establish whether or not a given actual distribution 
of income is better that another. It can only state the 
‘compensation principle’ that an improvement of wel-
fare has taken place if those better off are able to com-
pensate the loss of the lesser off, and still be better off 
than before (Little 1965: 105). However, welfare econo-
mics also has been biased towards the equalization of 
income distribution and progressive taxation. This bias 
originally springs from the utilitarian idea of diminis-
hing marginal utility (the more you have of some good, 
the less pleasure you get from getting an extra exem-
plar) from which follows that total social welfare can 
be increased by reallocating goods and services to 
the less well off. This idea has during the years been 
reformulated in various ways by referring to prevailing 
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preferences for economic equalization in western so-
cieties (e.g. Mishan 1960: 254).
All-embracing, eclectic and contested welfare
But welfare is more than economic welfare, even for 
welfare economics. For Bentham, welfare was con-
cerned not only with “subsistence” and “abundance”, 
i.e. economic welfare regulated through the market, 
but also with “security” and “equality” that should be 
regulated by legislation (Halevy 1952: 45 f ). I. M. D. Litt-
le (1965: 51) compares welfare to a well of unknown 
depth that can be filled from various taps, economic, 
political, etc. Only if the non-economic taps are closed 
can one say that welfare has improved by turning on 
the economic tap. But what is non-economic welfare? 
One contemporary answer is that non-economic welfare 
is welfare provided by the welfare state, but this again 
is an ambivalent concept. According to Bent Greve 
“there is still no agreed definition of what a welfare state 
is” (Greve 1998: 129), and for Avishai Margalit the idea 
of social welfare has an “eclectic character” which in-
dicates that ‘“the sources of the welfare river must be 
sought in many streams: Christian, socialist and statist 
(Bismarck)” (Margalit 1996: 222).
Henning Fonsmark, one of the participants in the 
intense debate on the coming welfare state that took 
place in Denmark in the 1950s and early 1960s (Fons-
mark 1962), looks back 30 years later at the debate 
for precise ideas and delimitations of the concept. He 
looks back in vain. The Social Democrats used the con-
cept in a positive and very broad sense, often syno-
nymously with “democratic socialism” and as including 
“respect for the human being” as well as “equal oppor-
tunities for all throughout life” (Fonsmark 1990: 171). 
Social solidarity should be more comprehensive than 
public aid to the poor. Welfare should prevent people 
from coming in need of public help, and should be 
a guarantee for equal opportunities for all. Thus one 
should ensure the provision of schools and hospitals, 
the educational system, the care for the elderly, the ge-
neral life and work conditions of families and population 
at large, as well as their ways of utilizing leisure time 
(Ibid. 173). Contrary to the material commercialism of 
private capital, the public sector should provide for 
“spiritual welfare”. Material needs having been cove-
red by public redistribution, welfare politics should also 
include culture: adult education, radio and television 
as non-commercial public services, all of which would 
strengthen participation in democratic processes and 
institutions (Ibid. 175). The welfare state should on the 
one hand protect human beings gainst the market 
and the specialists and experts of the new technolo-
gies (Ibid. 178). On the other hand, it would require 
other groups of experts to identify and solve problems 
of welfare: psychologists, teachers, doctors, architects, 
cultural critics (Ibid. 182). The concept of welfare in this 
way was surely “all embracing” (Ibid. 181).
Just as embracing as it was, just as contested it 
was. Welfare experts and professionals were cha-
racterised as a new “ruling class” (Dich 1973) that 
defined the needs of others while pursuing its own ex-
pansive interests as a professional group. Liberal and 
conservative opponents perceived the welfare state 
as a “paternalistic state” socializing values related to 
all fields of life (Ibid. 186 f ). Instead the welfare state 
should always draw limitations to itself. Ordinary 
voters are responsible for their own life and deeds, and 
only when this does not function, should social solida-
rity provide welfare for the weak (Ibid. 196–98). From 
the political Left, the welfare state was criticized as a 
compromise between the bourgeoisie and the working 
class thus preventing revolution, and for being based 
on a capitalist economy continually producing the 
very social problems that the welfare state was inten-
ded to solve. It was, however, also embraced by the less 
revolutionary Left as an intermediary step towards so-
cialism (Ibid. 190 f ).
This debate from the 1960s seems surprisingly re-
levant today. It captures many of the major questions 
related also to the contemporary debate on welfare. 
Let us therefore sum up the concept as it is illuminated 
by welfare economics and the debate on the welfare 
state:
The concept of welfare relates to a wide diversity 
of issues such as the quantity, quality and distribution 
of material goods and services, the (re)distribution of 
income, protection against poverty, the security of 
employment and wealth, the provision of health care, 
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education and culture, the provision of security and 
shelter, the guarantee of a certain equality and equa-
lity of opportunities, the support of and participation 
in democratic institutions, the general quality of life. 
Interwoven in this comprehensiveness is an evaluative 
dimension. By declaring something as welfare it is also 
appreciated as such: is the distribution of wealth a 
welfare distribution, and could someone be better 
off without anyone becoming worse off in terms of 
happiness or preference? Social services and transfer 
payments should, as welfare provisions, also be contri-
buting to the good life. But are they? Do they create 
dependency? Are the collective provisions of welfare 
services oppressive rather than liberating and promo-
ting the good life? The appreciative component of the 
concept and the complexity and diversity of the refe-
rential content turns the concept into a contested one 
(Gallie 1956, Connolly 1974). This, by the way, not only 
relates to politics and ideology, but also to research: 
Liberal authors mistrust state intervention a priori, 
while Social-Democratic and Christian-Democratic 
authors all too easily take social problems as evidence of 
the state’s responsibility to solve problems. (Kaufmann 
2001: 16) 
Further evidence of this relationship follows below.
The good, the bad and the ugly
The concept of welfare is differentiated and contested. 
Just as differentiated and contested are the ways of 
organizing welfare provision. Family, friends, relatives 
and neighbours, charitable and voluntary organisa-
tions, the market, and the state provide welfare (Pinch 
1997: 7–11). Within different nation-states such diffe-
rent ways of welfare provision occur in various combi-
nations.
Following from this, a diversity of welfare state ty-
pologies have occurred in the social sciences, most of 
them with a focus on the state-market distinction. The 
classical one was provided by Richard M. Tittmuss, who 
distinguished between three welfare models: The resi-
dual model in which the state only comes into opera-
tion as a last resort when family and market fail to cover 
welfare needs, the industrial achievement-performan-
ce model, in which welfare policies are geared towards 
the smooth functioning of the economy, and the insti-
tutional distributive model in which universal services 
are allocated by the state on the basis of need (Pinch 
1997: 12). Building on this typology Gøsta Esping-An-
dersen in (1990) presented his highly influential typo-
logy of welfare regimes, which is focused on the ways 
in which welfare provision is allocated between state, 
market and households. The liberal welfare regime is 
committed to minimize the role of the state, to indi-
vidualize risk and to promote market solutions. The 
definition of risk is narrow and need-based, resemb-
ling the poor relief of the 19th century. The conception 
of what risks should be considered ‘social’ is narrow as 
well, and the promotion of market solutions encou-
rages individual and collective insurance solutions 
to welfare problems. The liberal regime corresponds 
to Anglo-Saxon countries such as the US, Canada, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, Ireland and the UK (Esping-Ander-
sen 1999: 74–78).
The conservative welfare regime blends status 
segmentation and familialism. Welfare provisions are 
strongly related to status differentiation, often favou-
ring civil servants’ benefits. Corporate status divisions 
permeate the systems of social security. Risks are poo-
led within particular occupational groups or social 
strata. Familialism, i.e. a composite of the male bread 
winner as social protection and the family as central 
caregiver being ultimately responsible for its mem-
bers’ welfare, implies that parents or children are legal-
ly responsible for children or parents in case of need. 
The inclination to provide public family care services 
is low. Voluntary associations play a key role in the pro-
vision of welfare in conservative welfare regimes (Ibid. 
81–84). Countries such as Germany, Belgium, France, 
Italy and Spain exemplify this model.
The social democratic welfare regime is committed 
to universalism, i.e. the provision of welfare as a right 
for individuals based on citizenship, rather than as de-
monstrated need, or based on a corporate occupatio-
nal relationship. The regime actively works to minimi-
ze market dependency with the intent of maximizing 
equality. Welfare is ‘de-commodified’ in the sense that 
market dependency is counteracted by granting en-
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titlements independent of market participation (Ibid. 
43). Welfare compensations are generous, and risks are 
comprehensively socialized. Welfare provision is highly 
“de-familiarized” due to the participation of women in 
the wage-labour force. The regime is committed to full 
employment and productivism in the sense of maxi-
mizing the productive potential of the citizenry (Ibid. 
78–81). The social democratic regime corresponds to 
the Nordic countries.
Reflecting on the huge debate on this threefold 
typology, Esping-Andersen has proposed a fourth 
welfare regime centred on familialism. In such a re-
gime, which is exemplified by Mediterranean Europe 
and Japan, the provision of welfare is dominated by fa-
milialism. Here de-commodification means strengthe-
ning the position of the male breadwinner, family wel-
fare benefits are low and family production of welfare is 
high (Ibid. 50–67).
Other typologies have been presented in the de-
bate and could have been mentioned here (cf. Merrien 
2002: 215 ff). The point in the present context is, howe-
ver, only to emphasize two things. Firstly, that the ways 
of organizing welfare within different nation states are 
diverse. This should be a caution against generalizing 
statements on the development of welfare provision 
systems. Secondly, just as the concept of welfare is a 
contested concept, so are the typologies of systems 
of welfare provision. This is not only in regard to em-
pirical validity and theoretical consistency1, but also 
in the sense that the typologies may contain implicit 
evaluations of the different types. Thus it has been ar-
gued that there is a normative dimension to Esping-
Andersen’s typology. The social democratic regime 
is the good one because it is strongest in de-com-
modification and social rights, and thus pushing back 
the frontiers of capitalist power. The liberal regime is 
the bad one because the state encourages the market 
and minimizes de-commodification. The conserva-
tive regime is neither really good, nor really bad, but 
just ugly, because it keeps and strengthens the status 
orientation of the conservative ‘Sozialstaat’ and the 
corresponding social inequality (Manow 2002: 204). 
Thus the typology implicitly measures the other regi-
mes by the standard of the social democratic regime; 
by more or less proximity to Stockholm (ibid: 205, cf. 
Jensen 1999)!
In the following we will maintain Esping-
Andersen’s typology. This is not because we share 
the evaluations or find the criticisms irrelevant. The 
reason is that the typology is sufficient for our main 
purpose, which is to emphasize at a general level the 
diversity of the forms of welfare provision. It does not 
subtract from the value of the typology in this regard, 
that it has played a highly important part in the welfare 
debates of the recent decade.
Utilitarianism, architecture and the modern city
For Bentham, utility was not only a question of the pro-
vision of goods via the market. As mentioned above, 
it was also a question of state regulation. The greatest 
happiness of the greatest number could be provided 
by law, regulation and planning. By measuring plea-
sure and pain the human condition could be regulated 
in such a way that pleasure was maximized and pain 
minimized for the greatest number of individuals in 
a society. As an example, punishment should only be 
accepted if it served the goal of utility. Punishment 
should not inflict the same amount of pain as suffered 
by the victim, but prevent others from committing 
similar crimes, and in this way increase overall utility. 
Bentham’s well-known idea of the panopticon-prison 
should remind outsiders that their utility would de-
crease if imprisoned, and organize surveillance inter-
nally in such a way that the imprisoned were surveying 
themselves, thus maximizing utility and minimizing 
costs. The calculation of pleasure and pain, the maxi-
mization of utility and minimization of cost should be 
the vehicle for rationality, transparency and control. 
Everything, pushpin as well as poetry, could be re-
duced to and measured according to utility (Diken & 
Laustsen 2002: 100 f ).
Such ideas of a rational society also entered archi-
tectural thinking. This is shown in the theoretical 
work of Jean-Nicolas-Louis Durand, professor of ar-
chitecture at the École Polytechnique in Paris. In 1795 
he stated that
In all times and all places, all the thoughts of man and 
all his actions have their origin in these two principles: 
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The love of well-being and the aversion of all kinds of 
pain. That is why men, in isolation when they construct 
private buildings or united in society when they rise 
public buildings, should search to 1) draw from the 
buildings they construct the greatest advantage and 
consequently make them in the most convenient way 
for their purpose and 2) to build in the least painful way 
in the beginning and the least expensive way later on, 
when money became the price of labour. 
(Durand, quoted in Fixot 1999: 138)
Here, architecture is submitted to the criteria of maximi-
zing the utility of the building, while at the same time maxi-
mizing efficiency in building production. The idea was 
“to achieve maximum result with minimum effort” by 
reducing “the system of values in architecture [...] to a 
scale between pleasure and pain” (Pérez-Goméz 1983: 
303). In this regard Durand proposed that elementary 
geometrical forms were the most efficient. “The more 
symmetrical, regular, and simple a building is, the less 
costly it will be” (Ibid. 300). In the case of private com-
missions, the task of the architect was to design and 
construct the most convenient building with a given 
amount of money. In the case of a public institution, 
the architect should make the most economical con-
struction of a building whose details were already 
known (Ibid. 302 f ). Geometrical forms did not have 
any transcendent, metaphysical or symbolic meaning, 
they were just efficient and useful, and architectural 
decoration should be avoided as disutility. “If economy 
prescribes the greatest simplicity in regard to all the 
necessary things, it prohibits absolutely all that is not 
useful” (Durand, quoted in Fixot 1999: 138). The cha-
racter and style of a building likewise should not be 
subject to separate consideration; it would spring from 
the utilitarian solution to the design task (Pérez-Goméz 
1983: 302). Hence, architecture had no other objective 
than “private and public usefulness, the conservation 
and happiness of individuals, families and society” 
(Durand, quoted in Pérez-Goméz 1983: 299).
As pointed out by Pérez-Goméz and Fixot, such 
utilitarianism reappeared in 20th century functiona-
lism, which became the architectural and urban ideo-
logy of the modern city. Here comfort had prevalence 
over metaphysical or symbolic meaning (Pérez-Go-
méz 1983: 303), and just like in Durand’s theory, where 
number and geometry were turned into technical in-
struments for ensuring efficiency, so also 
the geometry of the Bauhaus, the International Style, and 
the Modern Movement [...] was essentially the undiffe-
rentiated product of a technological world view [ha-
ving] cast off metaphysical speculation.    
             (Ibid. 311)
What Durand had theorized at the level of the building, 
the Modern movement realised at all levels of urban 
space, from the housing unit to the whole city (Fixot 
1999: 153). 
Just like Durand, Le Corbusier emphasized the effi-
ciency and utility of non-complex forms. The straight 
line and geometrical forms signified belief in science 
and technique. Circulation needed linearity, not cur-
ves; standardization impregnated his architectural 
thought. The goal was simplicity, order, efficiency 
and purity. The modern spirit, according to Le Cor-
busier, was ‘purist’, searching efficiency everywhere 
“with a tendency towards rigueur, precision, the best 
utilization of forces and materials, the least waste, in 
sum a tendency towards purity” (Le Corbusier quoted 
in Fixot 1999: 160). This is a pure utilitarianism of pure 
form. The city was conceived as an efficiently organized 
and useful machine, creating order in the chaos of the 
non-regulated city with curved streets and crowded 
and socializing neighbourhoods. Even if the direct 
inspiration for Le Corbusier’s obsession with disorder, 
loss of time and detours was Taylor’s principles of sci-
entific management (Ascher 1995: 87), one can, in the 
spirit of Bentham, say that the modern idea of the city 
was one of ameliorating the disorderly and irrational 
city by means of a purifying urban planning, and in this 
way producing more happiness for greater numbers.
Similarly in the USA, architects in the 1930s counte-
red the professional threat from engineers, builders 
and manufacturers by leaving the Beaux-arts tradi-
tion. Within this tradition public housing could not 
be defined as an architectural problem. Here architec-
ture was “more than mere building”, and people “could 
not afford it” (Brain 1994: 210). “The modern architect 
should not design for the cultivated few, or for the cul-
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tural uplift of the masses, but for the human needs of 
the modern citizen, defined in terms of common rights 
and basic needs.” (Ibid. 211) Aligning with the public 
housing projects of the New Deal, architects focused 
on the provision of basic “decency, health, amenity, 
and comfort and convenience” by means of efficient 
standardization. Catherine Bauer, a well-known house 
reformer at the time, stated that standardized parts 
“instead of creating dull uniformity, [could] become a 
positive force in creating a unified whole”. This would 
make “meaningless surface ornament [...] not only un-
necessary but ridiculous”. The conclusion was that 
[g]ood materials, simple lines, and geometric forms 
become, when combined with carefully designed and 
planted open spaces, all the elements necessary to a 
authentic modern architecture.               (Bauer 
quoted in Brain 1994: 212)
Quite an echo from Durand!
In modern architecture and urban planning utility, 
efficiency, transparency and geometry fused to pu-
rify the new modern city into separated spaces for 
work, habitation, leisure and transport. This idea of 
utilitarian urban planning corresponded to the rea-
soning within welfare economics on externalities. Ex-
ternalities are cases where welfare effects, positive or 
negative, do not show up in market prices. In such cases 
public intervention is required. In the case of external 
diseconomies, public intervention would be needed 
to ameliorate the loss in welfare for some third party, C, 
due to market transactions between A and B. Also so-cal-
led public goods that are provided in common and are 
freely accessible, fall into the category of externalities 
(Andersen 1988: 43f, 64 ff). In the new urban sociology 
of the 1970s this question turned up as collective con-
sumption.
The welfare city concept
On this background a concept of ‘the welfare city’ 
seems meaningful. On the one hand the ideas of ar-
chitecture and urban planning, which shaped urban 
development in the years after the Second World War, 
were closely linked to the utilitarian ideas that are a 
founding part of welfare thinking in general. On the 
other hand this urban development, like the welfare 
state, was highly influenced by state interventionism. 
The utilitarian ideas were codified into the CIAM char-
ter, which also gathered “the principles and ways of 
thinking from Taylorism, Fordism, and in a certain 
way Keynesianism and the welfare state” (Ascher 
2002: 30). These principles became so influential after 
the Second World War that the urban development of 
these years has been characterized as a “taylo-fordo-
keynésio-corbusian” period (Ascher 1995: 86).
It must, however, be expected that the concept 
of the welfare city is just as heterogeneous, ambivalent 
and contested as the concepts of welfare, the welfare 
state or welfare regimes. In so far as the concept of the 
welfare city refers to urban built environments and ur-
ban ways of living, which have developed under the 
influence of the welfare state, this influence must be 
expected to vary according to the different forms of 
welfare regimes.
The welfare city as collective consumption
The imprint of the welfare state on the city was the 
underlying problem Manuel Castells hinted at in his 
famous discussion in the late 1960s of the object of 
urban sociology. He argued that only spatial units of 
collective consumption should count as the scientific 
object for urban sociology. Collective consumption he 
defined in various ways. He defined it as related to or-
ganizational and management features “given the na-
ture and size of the problems: e.g. housing, collective 
facilities, leisure provision, etc.” (Castells 1976: 75), but 
also as related to the character of certain needs that 
“make their satisfaction necessarily collective, due to 
the quantity of material means needed to meet them 
(Ibid. 81). On the other hand he denied that the col-
lectivistic character of consumption was due to some 
“intrinsic quality” of the consumption. Collective con-
sumption was taking place through the state appara-
tus, because it was not assured by capital due to “the 
specific and general interests of capital” (Castells 1977: 
460). Castells here explicitly referred to externalities in 
welfare economics: “‘Collective commodities’, say the 
marginalist economists, are those that have no mar-
ket price” (Ibid.). He was, though, not quite clear about 
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the role of the state. Collective means of consumption 
“increasingly depend on direct or indirect state inter-
vention” (Castells 1978: 38, italics na/bd), collective 
consumption is “largely determined by state activity” 
(Ibid. 181, italics na/bd). No wonder that he admitted 
that the concept has “a fluid character”, while at the 
same time he emphasized that it is “widely accepted 
that ‘collective goods’ are key factors in the economy 
and in social organization” (Ibid.).
However precisely defined, collective consumption 
goods had become increasingly important for the re-
production of labour power. According to Castells, the 
spatial concentration of collective means of consump-
tion therefore defines what is urban (1977: 449). An ur-
ban unit is defined as
the everyday space of a delimited fraction of the la-
bour force”, which, he says, is “not very different from 
the definition, current among geographers and econo-
mists, of an urban area on the basis of the map of com-
mutings. (Ibid. 445)
Seen in the light of the fluidity of the concept of wel-
fare, the fluidity of the concept of collective consump-
tion comes as no surprise. Neither does the fact that, 
despite this fluidity, the examples of collective con-
sumption are quite clear: housing, health, education, 
and sports, leisure and transport facilities. These are 
precisely some of the important collective goods and 
services provided under the heading of welfare by the 
welfare state and considered as such by welfare eco-
nomics.
Castells’ definition of the object of the new urban so-
ciology is focused on the provision of welfare goods 
and services for the labour force organized in collective 
form whether by state intervention or otherwise. This 
provision is located in the spatial units within which 
the labour force lives its everyday life, and these units 
are defined as urban. Castells here defines the urban in 
such a way that the development of the welfare state 
eo ipso is urban development. The development of 
the state as a welfare state, in so far as it is focused on 
goods and services for labour power, is the develop-
ment of the city as a welfare city, in so far as we look to 
the spatial form. The welfare state in this sense is the 
welfare city.
The social democratic welfare city
Juhani Lehto’s discussion of different cities in different 
welfare states is less demanding. Rather than implicitly 
identifying welfare state and welfare city, he argues 
that “national institutions, particularly the welfare 
state, have shaped and will continue to shape the de-
velopment of cities”, the implication being that diffe-
rent welfare regimes shape their cities in different ways 
(Lehto 2000: 112). Focusing on the social democratic 
welfare regimes in Scandinavia, which he seems to 
consider the most developed form of welfare regimes, 
he expects “the impact of the welfare state on cities” to 
be “most visible in Scandinavia” (Ibid. 113). Here, rapid 
urbanization and expansion of the welfare state have 
been “parallel phenomena” (Ibid. 117). Scandinavian 
cities, then, have developed as welfare cities. The pro-
vision of public welfare goods was a significant factor 
in the urbanization process attracting people away 
from rural life into cities (Ibid. 117). Yet, one should not 
for this reason identify welfare state as welfare city. The 
social democratic welfare regime is universalistic and 
based on social citizenship rights and does as such not 
distinguish between city and country. Social policies 
in the Scandinavian countries cannot be regarded as 
urban policies (Ibid. 118).
Universalism, then, excludes the identification of 
welfare state and welfare city in the Scandinavian 
context. This does not invalidate the concept of a 
welfare city as concept for the urban areas, which de-
veloped in the Scandinavian countries in the second 
half of the 20th century. Not only was the built environ-
ment highly imprinted by the provision of (local) state 
welfare goods: public housing, hospitals, schools, 
universities, libraries, sports and leisure facilities, care-
centres for children and the elderly, and infrastructural 
networks, the local welfare state also provided the city 
with new political actors and new configurations of 
political alliances. As urbanization increased, so did 
the part of the urban population employed in educa-
tion, health, social and cultural welfare services. Local 
welfare state employees and professionals became in-
fluential groups in urban politics just as the consumers 
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of welfare goods and services did. This created strong 
alliances against cuts in urban welfare provisions (Ibid. 
120–124).
The liberal welfare city
In the liberal welfare regime, the concept of a welfare 
city has quite another meaning. In the mid-1980s 
Gurr and King (1987) analyzed the importance of the 
state policies for urban development and decline, 
with special emphasis on the USA and the UK. They also 
discussed some alternative futures for western cities, 
distinguishing between prosperous new industrial ci-
ties and administrative and service cities on the one 
hand, and stagnant old industrial cities and welfa-
re cities on the other. The category “welfare city” was 
reserved for cities “in which there are no significant 
growth sectors, public or private, its residents subsis-
ting mainly on transfer payments, public employment 
and secondary service industries” (Ibid. 192). Such cities 
are “the economic backwaters of the advanced capi-
talist societies, largely abandoned by private capital, 
passed over in plans for regional redevelopment, and 
heavily dependent on government spending to main-
tain individual and collective existence at a subsistence 
level” (Ibid. 200).
Here the welfare city is a special case among contem-
porary cities, it is ‘a city on welfare’ in the pejorative li-
beral sense. This is not a welfare city in the Scandinavi-
an sense that manages to keep unemployment rates 
low, income distribution relatively even and propor-
tions of the poor small in comparison with most other 
OECD countries (Lehto 2000: 118). This is exactly the 
contrary: a residual welfare city with welfare focused 
on public transfer payments to maintain subsistence.
In a liberal welfare regime, welfare in an urban con-
text may, however, have a broader meaning. Analysing 
welfare in the metropolitan areas of the USA in the mid-
1970s, Diana Pearce and David Street present social 
welfare institutions in metropolitan areas as a
heterogeneous, uneven, and poorly bounded collec-
tion of programs, personnel and practices – both pu-
blic and private – that attend to the human needs in the 
name of the public good. (Pearce & Street 1978: 319 f )
Needs and services are collectively defined, but the 
collectivities may differ, and the providers may be private 
or public. 
Social welfare institutions range from the Club Scout 
pack meeting in a local church basement to the giant 
public hospital for the care of the poor. (Ibid. 320)
The public good is primarily focused on local commu-
nities, rather than on universalistic social citizenship 
rights, and is usually targeted to specific populations, 
with the aim of rectifying delinquent behaviour (Ibid. 
321). There is a tendency towards “bifurcation of so-
cial welfare” between “an inner-city “warehousing” and 
“containment” segment and a suburban “amenities” 
segment” (Ibid. 324). The suburbs tend to exclude the 
poor recipients of public welfare and consumers of pu-
blic housing. As a consequence the inner cities include 
“welfare mini-ghettoes”, while the suburbs include 
welfare amenities – desirable in all communities, rich 
as well as poor – such as “small clinics and private prac-
tices aimed at helping with individual adjustment” and 
“benefits to normal youths and adults” (Ibid. 323–24). 
The inner-city welfare institutions “emphasize sup-
port through public assistance and housing programs 
at subsistence level along with direct social control”, 
while suburban welfare “is fundamentally concerned 
with providing adjustment counselling and consum-
matory services to the families of the middle class” 
(Ibid. 324).
According to this description of the 1970s, welfare 
in American metropolitan areas very much parallels the 
liberal welfare regime. Being localist and communi-
tarian rather than universalistic and oriented by social 
citizenship, being organised privately as well as publicly 
and in hybrids of public-private organization, being tar-
geted to specific poor groups for social control or pri-
vately organised as amenities for the middle classes, 
welfare in urban areas reflects the liberal welfare re-
gime. As welfare cities American metropolitan areas 
were liberal welfare cities.
The conservative welfare city
While the distinction between a social democratic 
and a liberal welfare city can be established in a quite 
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clear-cut way, the situation is more difficult in regard 
to the city of the conservative welfare regime. This is 
due not least to the fact that such regimes (familialist 
regimes excepted) have been as statist as the social 
democratic regime in regard to the planning of the ur-
ban environment (Benassi et.al.1997). This especially 
has been the case in France (Fixot 1999). It might be 
argued that welfare policies in the conservative case 
reasonably can be characterized as urban policies, in 
so far as segmented welfare focused on occupational 
groups may have tended to concentrate in urban areas 
due to the general urbanization process. Further, the 
segmentation of welfare in the conservative model 
has shown in the urban areas as higher poverty rates, 
higher income differentials and lower participation of 
women in wage labour, just as well as housing policies 
have been less deliberately planned with the aim of 
preventing segregation than in the Nordic countries 
(Lehto 2000: 117–119).2 The question of the specificity 
of a conservative welfare city, however, needs further 
clarification.
The nation-bounded welfare state
The welfare state was, from the start, structurally rela-
ted to nation-building and national solidarity, and it 
has always been a nation-state (Giddens 1994: 137). 
T.H. Marshall conceives of welfare as social citizenship 
within this framework. In the 20th century social citi-
zenship extends the civil citizenship of the 18th cen-
tury and the political citizenship of the 19th century 
with “the right to share to the full in the social heritage 
and to live the life of a civilized being according to the 
standards prevailing in the society”. Social citizenship 
thus implies “a universal right to real income which is 
not proportional to the market value of the claimant” 
(Marshall quoted in Klausen 1996: 212). The ‘prevailing 
society’ mentioned here is the bounded society of the 
sovereign nation state, and the solidarity underpinning 
social citizenship is a national solidarity. As pointed 
out by Gunnar Myrdal in his book‘Beyond the Welfare 
State, from 1960: “the democratic Welfare State in the 
rich countries of the Western World is protectionist and 
nationalistic” (quoted in Klausen 1996: 216). The soli-
darity presupposed by this conception of welfare as a 
universal right was connected to the citizenship of the 
nation state, a national solidarity founded not only in 
the implicit organic solidarity (Durkheim) based on the 
interdependencies of a national division of labour (Lof-
tager 2003: 19 f ), but also in the more romantic idea 
(Turner 2002: 47) of a national community of a people, 
cf. the Swedish notion of the Social Democratic welfare 
regime as “Folkhemmet”, the “People’s Home” (Klau-
sen 1996: 214). Not only were the rights of welfare as 
social citizenship based on work (Turner 2001: 192) as 
one solidaristic pillar in the sense that “everybody was 
expected to contribute their share, but, if they could 
not, the community assumed the obligation of pro-
viding for the needy” (Klausen 1996: 214). This obliga-
tion furthermore also implied a shared style of life, a 
population united in a single civilization (Urry 2000: 
187). While social citizenship entitlements did not era-
dicate the class inequalities of capitalism, but modified 
such inequalities by bestowing equal status on those 
who fully and actively participate in their society (Urry 
2000: 164, Turner 2001: 190, 193), it did, in Europe, pre-
sume ethnical and racial homogeneity. Thus the wel-
fare state could take the form of a nation-state com-
munity implying a direct relationship between the 
nation-state and each member of the national com-
munity (Guiraudon 2002: 131).
Paul Pierson has aptly characterized the mature form 
of this nation-bounded welfare state as an “immovable 
object” (Pierson 1998), due to the fact that mature wel-
fare states have shown a marked resistance to change. 
There are two major basic sources for this resistance. 
One source is electoral support. As welfare states have 
expanded, so has the size of the electorate that recei-
ves welfare benefits or income from the welfare state. 
Also as a source of social stability and guarantor of 
basic rights of citizenship has the welfare state retained 
considerable legitimacy (Ibid. 552). The other source is 
institutional “stickiness”. Institutional stickiness on the 
one hand relates to political systems that allow mino-
rities to block reforms, on the other it relates to so-cal-
led ‘path dependence’, i.e. the fact that certain courses 
of development, once initiated, become increasingly 
costly to reverse. The costs of change increasingly ex-
ceed the costs of continuity. Policy-makers are ‘locked 
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in’ by commitments already made. This relates to sys-
tems of pensions provision as well as to complex sets 
of institutions and organizations (Ibid. 553).
The sticky, immovable welfare objects have, ho-
wever, been confronted with “irresistible forces” (Pi-
erson) from within the nation-states. A slowdown of 
productivity growth due to the post-industrial shift 
from manufacturing to services, the latter being more 
labour intensive (education, health care, child care) 
and more resistant to standardization, has impeded 
the growth of wages and salaries and therefore also 
the tax base of the welfare state (Ibid. 541 ff). The conti-
nuity, the expansion and institutionalization of welfare 
state commitments with the rising costs of‘“increased 
generosity” as a consequence, has been another ma-
jor source of pressure (Ibid. 545–50). And a third ma-
jor source comes from the ageing of the population, 
which has lead to higher health costs and increases in 
pension spending (Ibid. 553).
The different welfare regimes have adapted to these 
pressures as well as changed (restructured) according 
to their specific character. The social democratic wel-
fare regimes have adapted by expanding employment 
in the public service sector without worsening wage 
inequalities. The consequence has been increasing 
budgetary pressures on already high levels of taxes. 
In conservative regimes public service employment 
has been limited and labour market regulations and 
high fixed costs have impeded employment growth in 
the private service sector. The consequence has been 
increasing unemployment, “welfare without work” 
(Merrien 2002: 225), and a sharp division between insi-
ders and outsiders. In liberal regimes with strong bud-
getary restraints on public expenditure, employment 
in the service sector has been expanding at low-wage 
levels, causing mounting poverty and inequality becau-
se of weak social protection (Pierson 1998: 543–545; 
Merrien: Ibid.).
Changes, while reflecting the differences of the 
welfare regimes, have generally been incremental and 
centristic (Pierson 1998: 554). Change has taken the 
form of re-commodification of former de-commodified 
welfare provisions, the form of cost-containment in or-
der to prevent tax increases, and the form of reforms, 
either as rationalization, where welfare programs 
have been modified according to new ideas, or as up-
dating programs to meet changing societal demands 
and norms (Pierson 2002: 377 ff). Liberal welfare re-
gimes have focused on re-commodification and cost 
containment, the social democratic regimes on cost 
containment and rationalizing reform, and the con-
servative regimes on cost containment and updating 
(Ibid. 402).
Globalization and welfare regimes
Just as the welfare regimes have responded differently 
to the same internal forces of change, so they have 
responded differently to processes of globalization. 
Globalization is not a unitary process affecting diffe-
rent welfare regimes differently; rather, globalization 
means different things to different regimes. Different 
“dimensions of globalization create different ‘pressu-
re points’ on different welfare states, according to their 
specific institutional features” (Palier & Sykes 2001: 10). 
Globalization and welfare regimes are in “reciprocal in-
teraction” (Ibid. 12).
Thus for instance, globalization has put especially 
small European welfare states under pressure in re-
gard to mobile taxation objects. Taxation objects may 
be more or less mobile, and the more mobile the more 
welfare states may compete among each others on lo-
wering taxes, such as taxes on capital, companies and 
commodities (in case of border trade). Taxes on com-
panies have been lowered from an average of 50% to 
an average of 30% among small European states from 
1985 to 2004 (Andersen 2004: 150). 
Regarding labour and wages, it is often held that 
globalization has put the low-skilled and labour-in-
tensive mass-production sectors under pressure from 
competition from especially Asian countries. This ho-
wever, has mainly been of substantial importance in 
the liberal regimes of USA and UK, where comparatively 
low skilled, mass-production industry has dominated 
traditionally (Esping-Andersen 1999: 102). In general 
the regimes have reacted differently to such pressu-
res. Conservative regimes have opted for an exit strategy 
enabling workers to leave the labour market, liberal re-
gimes have employed a wage deregulation strategy to 
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bring down relative wage costs, and social democra-
tic regimes have responded by retraining program-
mes and the provision of welfare state jobs (Palier & 
Sykes 2001: 9).
Globalization also means mobility of people. High 
mobility of people between welfare states will be a th-
reat to the tax base of the welfare states, if people move 
towards lower taxes. However, in the EU-context, which 
implies free mobility for labour-power, such mobility still 
is very low (Andersen 2002: 26). Labour-power mobility 
thus far has not been a threat to keeping up the dif-
ferences in taxation levels between the different wel-
fare regimes, even if some high-income groups may 
have increased their mobility (Ibid. 28). Yet, even if 
labour-power mobility has been low, job mobility has 
been increasing due to the global integration of pro-
duct markets, which has made it less important than 
before where products are produced. This may put 
a pressure on the tax base of high-tax welfare states 
(high taxes reflected in high wages), but also induce 
such welfare states to increase the educational level of 
the labour-power in order to attract high-wage jobs. 
Such a strategy will hold as long as labour-power mobi-
lity is comparatively low (Ibid. 33). 
In general, globalization should not be seen as only 
a threat to welfare states. On the contrary, the small 
European welfare states have always operated in open 
economies. It was precisely because of the internatio-
nal vulnerability that the small European economies 
spearheaded strong worker protection and welfare 
guarantees (Esping-Andersen 1999: 102). Even if mobi-
lity, not least of all job mobility, has been increasing 
during the last 20 years, a stable welfare state may still 
be an advantage in the global economy in so far as the 
advantages of predictable models of wage regulation 
linked to productivity and competitiveness, a highly 
skilled and productive work force, and low levels of so-
cial conflict, may surpass the disinclination of global 
mobile capital to invest due to the scope of the public 
sector or high levels of wages (Merrien 2002: 224).
Migration, social citizenship and welfare
This being said, globalization must be expected to 
have an influence on the relationship between citi-
zenship and welfare. As mentioned above, welfare is 
primarily a nation-state phenomenon, linked to na-
tion-state solidarity and community. Citizenship 
also is still primarily a nation-state phenomenon. 
Under the pressure from globalization processes the 
frame of citizenship is, however, in certain respects 
becoming “denationalized” (Sassen 2004: 179). This 
happens in two ways, outwards and inwards. The out-
ward denationalization of citizenship mainly takes the 
form of the ‘augmentation’ of citizenship rights with 
human rights as formalised in international codes and 
laws (Turner 2001: 203, Urry 2000: 166). Human rights 
are conferred upon people as humans irrespective of 
national citizenship, and people thus can claim human 
rights even when they are stateless people and dispos-
sessed refugees (Turner 2000: 134). Globalization thus 
involves “the growing importance of human rights 
over nation-state citizenship rights” (Ibid. 135), for 
which reason they are also often seen as replacing citi-
zenship rights (Soysal 1994, cf. the critique of this posi-
tion in Faulks 2000: 142 ff). Inwardly the denationali-
zation of citizenship takes the form of granting social 
rights to non-citizens and in some cases also political 
rights at the local level (Ghiraudon 2002). In other 
cases legal status is granted to illegal immigrants due 
to the recognition of their practices in the residential 
community as citizenship practices (Sassen 2004: 187). 
Further, dual or multiple citizenships are increasingly 
being recognized (Turner 2002: 58).
Such changes create a solidarity problem for the 
universalistic model of welfare provision. This regime 
builds on an implicit solidarity contract for whole life 
spans. As an example the provision of education by 
public finance is premised on the condition of a later 
payback by taxation on higher income. With high mo-
bility among educated people, there will be an econo-
mic incitement to move to countries with another wel-
fare model. On the other hand the universalistic model 
will attract people with needs that can be fulfilled by 
the welfare regime, without participating in the public 
financing (Andersen 2002: 35). This will most often be 
the case for low-income groups, while the former app-
lies to high-income groups (Ibid. 28).
This problem clearly shows that welfare as related 
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to the nation-state and social citizenship implies a dis-
tinction between inclusion and exclusion. Citizenship 
“creates an internal space of social rights and solidarity, 
and thus an external, exclusionary force of non-mem-
bership” (Turner 2000: 135). Paradoxically, then, the 
universalistic regime of welfare provision as linked to 
nation-state citizenship is presumably also the most 
exclusionary regime.
Seen in this perspective the social democratic regime 
may come under pressure from globalization proces-
ses and the denationalization of citizenship to move 
towards insurance and corporate community based 
systems of welfare provision. In such systems provision 
and payment are more directly connected and therefo-
re less demanding in regard to nation-state based prin-
ciples of solidarity (Andersen 2002: 35, Abrahamson & 
Borchorst 2001: 50). 
Another possibility is that solidarity based on na-
tion-state citizenship will be strengthened by inhi-
biting immigration and weakening the provision of 
welfare for non-citizens as much as possible within 
the limits of the human rights conventions. Until re-
cently legal immigrants to EU-countries have enjoyed 
the same social rights as nationals, even if the politi-
cal climate from 1970 onwards has been increasingly 
hostile to immigrants. When family reunifications took 
place, foreigners’ contributions to the welfare state no 
longer outweighed the benefits they received. Yet they 
gained social rights and in some cases also local politi-
cal rights as in the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark 
(Guiraudon 2002: 129). The explanation can be found 
in the administrative and juridical apparatuses. Rela-
tively insulated from electoral politics they extended 
the prevailing national social rights to foreigners (Ibid. 
130).
This insulation from electoral politics was broken 
during the 1990s. What followed was a much more res-
trictive politics towards immigrants and a revitalization 
of the notion of welfare for nation-state citizens. In the 
Danish case such “universalistic-excluding” policies 
of “Danish Welfare for the Danes” has been strongly 
promoted by the Danish Peoples Party, recently with 
considerable political influence. Significantly, in the 
World Value Survey conducted in 1990 among the 
European peoples, it was precisely the people of the 
Nordic countries that considered themselves more 
as nationalists than as cosmopolitans. While in Western 
Europe the ratio between cosmopolitans and natio-
nalists was between 1:1 and 1:2, in Scandinavia it was 
about 1:3 (Urry 2000: 178). Such processes exemplify 
the observation by Manuel Castells that the weakening 
of national sovereignty by supranational EU-institu-
tions and the coming of immigrants consolidating 
multi-cultural and multi-ethnic communities in most 
Western European Countries, leads to a strengthening 
of territorially defined identities (Castells 1994: 24).
Globalization, segretation and the welfare city
The impact of globalization on welfare cities is as diverse 
as on the regimes of welfare. Some general tendencies, 
though, seem to have been prevailing. The increasing 
integration of urban economies into the global eco-
nomy has accentuated the importance of urban areas 
as central loci of economic growth. Cities have entered 
an inter-urban competition in regard to differentiating 
from each other. Whereas in the modern welfare city 
within the confines of the nation state cities should 
provide similar welfare goods and services, wherever 
people moved, in the global economic space the point 
of cities is to make a difference that makes a difference. 
In global economic space cities should be “branded”. 
This shift can be seen as a shift in urban politics from 
policies dominated by welfare issues to urban policies 
dominated by issues of economic growth, changing 
the welfare city into an ‘entrepreneurial city’ focused 
on public support of private enterprise, new infrastruc-
ture, attractive housing, cultural institutions and priva-
tization of public service (Sehested 2003: 13). With the 
diversity of welfare regimes and their different ways 
of responding in sticky ways to irresistible pressures in 
mind, we consider such changes as modifications of 
the welfare city, as the emergence of an‘entrepreneurial 
welfare city that can take different forms in different 
welfare regimes. Also employment policies are welfare 
policies, welfare can be provided in many forms, as pu-
blic-private cooperation and in market forms (Bailey 
2001), and entrepreneurial policies and welfare poli-
cies do not exclude each other (Sehested 2003: 15). In 
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a global economy a stable welfare regime may be an 
advantage and the same may be true for a welfare city. As 
an example, the Liberal major of the city of Aarhus, Den-
mark, in a recent discussion in local television on local po-
litics on the one hand stressed entrepreneurial issues: the 
necessity of branding Aarhus as a centre for culture and 
research and of establishing a common value founda-
tion for urban politics. On the other hand the emphasis 
was on traditional welfare issues: the necessity of fin-
ding new ways of public participation in planning and, 
when asked about her picture of Aarhus in 20 years, 
that Aarhus hopefully still will be a city characterized 
by good living conditions for children, the young, the 
mid-aged and the elderly.
It is often stressed that social polarization has been 
increasing in the urban areas of the global economic 
space. The main examples have been global cities like 
New York or Los Angeles, where globalization has cau-
sed dramatic growth in financial and business services 
and a rapid decline of manufacturing industry. Service 
sector employment shows a sharper division between 
high- and low paying jobs than employment in manu-
facturing industry. This division is reinforced by the 
derivative rise of low-skilled and low-wage service 
jobs in hotels, catering, cleaning, personal services 
etc. and the rise of a “downgraded” manufacturing sec-
tor with informal and sweated low-skill and low-paid 
work, often immigrant labour. In this way the social 
structure has been polarised: the middle has declined 
and the top and the bottom has shown absolute growth 
(Sassen 1991 as quoted in Hamnett 2001: 165).
This polarized picture may be true for some global 
cities in the USA, but it has been seriously questioned 
in the case of Europe. London, Paris, the Randstad 
in Holland and Copenhagen has been shown not to 
exhibit such social polarization (Hamnett 2001, Pre-
teceille 1997, Andersen & Clark, 2003). Rather, post-in-
dustrialization here has caused an upward shift in the 
social structure, with rising employment for managers 
and professionals of diverse kinds and decline for 
unskilled labour. Rather than a polarization a “profes-
sionalization” of the social structure has taken place 
in such cities (Hamnett 2001: 170). In the Copenhagen 
region there have in the period 1981–1997 been no 
signs of income polarization. On the contrary, lower 
individual incomes have shown the highest rate of 
growth, due to income transfers from the welfare state 
(Andersen (forthcoming): 7). In so far the Copenhagen 
example confirms the general statement by Lehto that 
within European welfare states the Scandinavian welfare 
states have shown lower poverty rates and income dif-
ferentials, than the rest of Europe (Lehto 2000: 117). 
Social polarization, then, is not a necessary conse-
quence of globalization. Here welfare policies matter. 
Neither can spatial polarization be directly read of from 
social polarization. Spatial polarization has in fact 
been increasing in Scandinavia, even if social polariza-
tion has not (Andersen (forthcoming), Andersen & Clark 
2003). In the Copenhagen area income differences 
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between neighbourhoods have grown considerably 
from 1981 to 1997. Neighbourhoods already concen-
trating very high incomes have continued to do so and 
have increased in number, just as well as the number 
of neighbourhoods with very low levels of income has 
been rising. In such neighbourhoods immigrants and 
refugees are also concentrated. The decisive factor in 
this polarization has been the unequal distribution of 
high-income earners (Andersen (forthcoming): 10). 
This also counts for the other Scandinavian countries 
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(Andersen & Clark 2003). In regard to spatial segrega-
tion, the social democratic welfare city has become 
polarized. Precisely the welfare policies of an earlier 
period have provided the material conditions for this: 
the functionalist housing estates on the one hand, and 
public supported private welfare in the form of tax 
reductions on ownership housing on the other (Ibid. 
98 f ). The former now concentrates low-income groups 
and immigrants, the latter middle- and high-income 
groups.
The new urban question
In the spatial polarization of the welfare city Jacques Don-
zelot sees a new urban question. If the urban question 
of the early welfare city was formulated by Manuel Cas-
tells as the question of the city as the spatial location of 
the public provision of welfare goods and services for 
labour-power and the related urban struggles, then the 
falling apart of the welfare city into unconnected frag-
ments and the urban problems related to this situation, 
is the new urban question (Donzelot 1999). Spatially, 
urban regions are today not only segregated, but se-
parated, splintered (May et al. 1998, Graham & Marvin 
2001) into different kinds of spatial enclaves for diffe-
rent kinds of social lives, unrelated to each other. Urban 
segregation has turned into urban secession (Donzelot 
1999: 109). On the one hand the disordered, violent life 
in the social or ethnical ghettoes, on the other hand the 
“vie affinitaire” in the suburbs and gated communities 
for those who have the means to choose in the ‘autono-
mous’ way of the free market, similar people as neigh-
bours (Ibid. 98–106). In this process where the latter 
are consciously fleeing the former, the poor become 
“more poor and more violent, the rich, more distant, 
less solidary” (Ibid. 106).
According to Donzelot, urban policies answering to 
this situation must confront this mechanism of circular 
reinforcement of the “in-civil society” and “affinitary urba-
nism”. There is no perfect solution to this problem, but he 
points to the USA for relevant experiences. The problem 
of security and the problem of distribution of wealth 
are tackled by public and private investment into the 
empowerment of inner city areas (Ibid. 113). Communi-
ty development corporations focus on the physical reha-
bilitation of degraded neighbourhoods as a means to 
restoring communitarian life (Donzelot 2003: 137–40, 
Donzelot et.al. 2003).
Empowerment strategies have also been used in the 
Scandinavian context (Andersen et. al. 2003, Sehested 
(ed.) 2003). The question however is if Donzelot has 
located‘the urban question for the contemporary wel-
fare city. No doubt that spatial polarization is a major 
contemporary problem for all types of welfare cities, 
and perhaps the major problem for the liberal welfare 
city (Musterd & de Winter 1998). Spatial polarization 
can be destabilizing for the solidarity basis of the wel-
fare city precisely because of the secession of urban 
spaces and populations. However, the secession thesis 
is problematical in two ways: the gated communities 
and their inhabitants are highly dependent on the 
surrounding urban fabric, and the fragmented urban 
landscapes show a multiplicity of ways and spaces of li-
ving and working that are interlinked by infrastructural 
networks and mobilities (Ascher & Godard 1999: 179). 
This points to a new underlying question of solidarity.
In the new urban regions social networks are neither 
strong in the mechanical sense of Durkheim, i.e. marked 
by strong, but few links to similar people, nor strong in 
the organic sense of Durkheim, i.e. marked by strong, but 
diversified links within a division of labour. As mentio-
ned above organic solidarity is founding the Marsh-
allian social citizenship (Loftager 2003) and thus also 
the urban citizenship of the national, industrial and 
social democratic welfare city. But the paradox of the 
welfare state, not least the universalistic type, is that 
it includes a tendency towards undermining its own 
basis of solidarity. It produces individualization precisely 
by caring for the problems of redistribution and risk 
(Ascher & Godard 1999: 183). This does not, however, 
make the concept of solidarity irrelevant. In view of the 
stickiness of the welfare state it rather calls for another, 
a third conception of solidarity, a solidarity based on 
a multiplicity of weak, changing and diversified links 
that associates individuals to different social networks 
(Ibid. 184).
If the basis of solidarity for welfare in general and for 
urban welfare in particular is shifting in the direction 
of a third solidarity, then this perhaps should be consi-
dered as the new urban question for the welfare city, 
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at least for the universalistic one. Which urban policies 
are possible and appropriate on such a background? 
Further, what kind of citizenship does it call for? Isn’t 
it the ironical kind of citizenship that Bryan S. Turner 
(2000, 2002) is arguing for in the context of globaliza-
tion: a cosmopolitan citizenship marked by cool loyal-
ties and thin patterns of solidarity? Cool loyalties, but 
not disloyalty towards a national culture, marked by 
the ironic ability to reflexively distance oneself from 
one’s own culture, making the respect for others pos-
sible without disloyalty towards one’s own background. 
And thin patterns of solidarity like e-mail friendships.
This very much looks like the social relations Georg 
Simmel in his classical essay on the metropolis and urban 
life (1950) characterized as specific for the metropolis. 
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